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I. INTRODUCTION 
Eighteen months after the 709 crackdown on human rights 
lawyers,1 a debate took place within China’s human rights lawyers’ 
communities. 2  It is a brief, yet passionate and provocative debate 
focusing on some of the fundamental questions about law’s limits in 
seeking justice and protecting rights in an authoritarian state and the 
limited role of lawyers in their endeavour. Having grown for about 
twenty years since the mid-1990s, human rights lawyers have engaged 
in social-legal activism in wide policy areas including consumer 
protection, anti-discrimination, rights in the criminal process, and the 
 
* Faculty of law, The University of Hong Kong. This research was supported by a grant 
from the RGC General Research Fund (HKU17613515).  
1. For a critical analysis of the crackdown, see Fu Hualing, The July 9th (709) Crackdown 
on Human Rights Lawyers: Legal Advocacy in an Authoritarian State, J. OF CONTEMPORARY 
CHINA (forthcoming, 2018). 
        2. See, e.g., Chen Jiangang, Zhang Sizhi Lun [Thoughts on Zhang Sizhi] (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.mychinese.news/2016/11/blog-post_16.html [https://perma.cc/EV4C-88JY]; Yan 
Wenxin, Zaitan Gean Tuidong Fazhi [Rethink About Promoting Rule of Law Through 
Individual Cases, WALL OUTSIDE (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.letscorp.net/archives/113008 
[https://perma.cc/SL84-3YQD]. 
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freedom of religion and speech.3 The growth of legal rights and their 
enhanced protection in China in the past two decades are inextricably 
tied to China’s growing legal profession, especially a small group of 
lawyers who variously called themselves weiquan lawyers, die-hard 
lawyers, or human rights lawyers—lawyers who are public interest-
minded, legal rights-focused, and politically motivated in their battles 
against arbitrary powers.4 
Yet, those are the lawyers who have received severe crackdown, 
and the repression has naturally provoked some of them to reflect on 
the vulnerability of the legal profession in the authoritarian state and 
the future prospect of socio-legal activism in bringing meaningful 
changes in society.5 The debate involved two issues: one specific and 
the other one general. The specific, pointed question that they have 
raised is this: is the traditional case-focused and law-centred legal 
mobilization, moderate or aggressive, still a feasible approach to take 
to bring structural changes to the political system, incremental or 
otherwise? 6  In the aftermath of the crackdown, estranged lawyers 
started to reflect on their past success and failure, to cast doubts about 
their potential of their own profession in catalysing political 
transformation, and to express their deeply felt anxiety, frustration, and 
confusion about law, courts, and human rights lawyering.7 
A more general question touches on a more sensitive issue relating 
to the politics of lawyering. For the rights lawyers who have 
experienced or witnessed the crackdown, the Party has revealed its true 
nature and whatever hope that lawyers may have on law’s potential to 
tame the Party must have proven false.8 For them, what matters in the 
Chinese political-legal system is Article 1 of the Constitution that states 
 
        3 . See generally Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, Climbing the Weiquan Ladder: A 
Radicalizing Process for Rights-Protection Lawyers, 205 THE CHINA QUARTERLY 40-59 (2011). 
4. See JONATHAN BENNEY, DEFENDING RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA (2012); Fu 
Hualing & Richard Cullen (2008), Weinquan (Rights Protection) Lawyering in an Authoritarian 
State: Building a Culture of Public Interesting Lawyering, 59 CHINA J. 111 (2008); EVA PILS, 
CHINA’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS: ADVOCACY AND RESISTANCE (2014); Rachel E Stern, 
Activist Lawyers in Post-Tiananmen China, 42 L. AND SOC. INQUIRY 234-51 (2017). 
        5. See, e.g., Sui Muqing, 709 zhishang: 709 Jingli  [My Experience as a 709 Victim], 
HRIC, https://www.hrichina.org/chs/zhong-guo-ren-quan-shuang-zhou-kan/sui-mu-qing-lu-
shi-709zhi-shang-wo-de-709jing-li-tu [https://perma.cc/4G4A-C6LV]. 
6. For an analysis of the spectrum of human rights lawyering in China, see Fu and Cullen, 
supra note 4. See also Sida Liu and Terence G. Halliday, CRIMINAL DEFENSE IN CHINA: THE 
POLITICS OF LAWYERS AT WORK (2016). 
        7. Yan, supra note 2. 
        8. Id. 
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clearly that China is a democratic dictatorship.9 The occasional success 
in a few legal battles, they admit, may have blinded their eyes on the 
true nature of the Party state.10 Some of them, they admit, may just have 
forgotten that, in Svolik’s terms, repression is the “original sin” of 
authoritarianism.11 If that were the case, human rights lawyers should 
step out of the shadow of law, call a spade a spade and confront the 
Party head-on. Human rights lawyers need to be openly political. 
Before the 2015 crackdown, China had experienced waves of 
social-legal activism since the mid-1990s in which right discourses are 
translated into rights practices.12 As it happens, human rights lawyers 
and other activists have been situated at the forefront in the tireless 
efforts to expanding the sphere of rights and freedom and in 
constraining the arbitrary exercise of state power. 13  Together with 
media, especially social media and domestic Non-governmental 
organizations (“NGOs”) working in different sectors, human rights 
lawyers form a strategic “legal complex” in China in protecting legal 
rights and freedom and in the process hold the Party state accountable 
to its own legal rhetoric.14 Supported and sometimes aided by foreign 
donors, the legal complex used law as an entry point to engage in 
social-legal activism in shaping public opinions and influencing court 
decisions. For what they have done in leading and organizing those 
movements, lawyers and other activists have paid heavy prices and, one 
may argue, the prices that they pay are precisely indicative of their 
significance and impact. During the crackdown, leading human rights 
lawyers were placed under lengthy and secretive detention; many were 
humiliated and forced to confess their sins in state controlled or 
arranged media outlets, some were sentenced to lengthy imprisonment 
terms for subverting state power, and all were placed under tight 
control. 15  The post-crackdown era also witnessed enhanced 
professional regulation by the government regulators—the Ministry of 
 
         9.   Id. 
        10.  Id. 
11. See MILAN W. SVOLIK, THE POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE 10 (2012). 
12. See generally BENNEY, supra note 4; Fu & Cullen, supra note 4; Pils, supra note 4; 
Stern supra note 4. 
        13. See generally Fu, supra note 1. 
        14. See Fu Hualing, Can Lawyers Build a Legal Complex for the Rule of Law in China?, 
HRIC (July 25, 2014), https://www.hrichina.org/en/china-rights-forum/can-lawyers-build-
legal-complex-rule-law-china [https://perma.cc/TN3L-VLFV]. 
        15 . See CHINA HUMAN RIGHTS LAWYERS CONCERN GROUP, REPORT ON THE 709 
CRACKDOWN (2016). 
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Justice (“MoJ”) and its provincial and local counterparts.16 With the 
appointment of Fu Zhenghua as the Minister of Justice, the Party seems 
to be determined to disappear human rights lawyering in China once 
for all.17 
Ultimately all the challenging questions boil down to this: is there 
a future for human rights lawyering in China as we know it? After 
examining the debate on the future of rights lawyering among human 
rights lawyers, this article proposes three overlapping alternatives for 
human rights lawyers in the post-crackdown era: a triviality thesis, a 
co-optation thesis, and a resilience thesis. While the authoritarian 
system can be suffocating for its enemies, human rights lawyers can 
struggle to create their own breathing space.   
II. TRIVIALITY 
The Triviality Thesis is a popular one and has gained currency in 
recent years.18 According to this thesis, the party-state has developed a 
tight control, through fear and enhanced management, over the 
profession, which is now structured in such a way that the political role 
of lawyers is negligible.19 It is not as if lawyers have not tried; human 
rights lawyers have tried in many ways, in vain, to have an impact on 
the system.20 No matter how hard lawyers try, either in working within 
the law or against the law, the system, as is expected, remains in firm 
 
        16. Chinese Authorities Continue to Suppress Lawyers after Replacing Minister of 
Justice, CONG.-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA (Mar. 15, 2018), https:// 
www.cecc.gov/publications/commission-analysis/chinese-authorities-continue-to-suppress-
lawyers-after-replacing [https://perma.cc/3KCN-ZWFT]. 
17. As the Chief of the Beijing Police, Fu apparently orchestrated the 2011 jasmine 
crackdown on human rights lawyers in Beijing. Fu was then promoted to the Ministry of Public 
Security. As the Executive Vice Minister of Public security, he was behind the July 9 crackdown 
on human rights lawyers in 2015. See Christian Shepherd, Chinese Rights Activists Fearful as 
Policeman Takes Charge of Legal Affairs, REUTERS (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-china-parliament-rights/chinese-rights-activists-fearful-as-policeman-takes-charge-
of-legal-affairs-idUSKBN1GX0C5 [https://perma.cc/L2RM-5PTZ]. 
        18. See, e.g., Yan, supra note 2; Yedu, Fazhi Mengmie: Zhongguo Weiquan Yundong Binlin 
Zhongjie [Broken Dream of the Rule of Law: China’s Weiquan Movement is Coming to an End], 
12 DONGXIANG (2016), https://botanwang.com/articles/201612/法治梦灭，中国维权运动濒
临终结.html [https://perma.cc/Y76L-7ZJM]. 
        19. See, e.g., Han Zhu, Eva Pils’s Human Rights in China, 19 ASIA-PACIFIC J. HUM. RTS 
AND THE L. 74, 76 (2018) (book review). 
        20. See Eva Pils, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CHINA: A SOCIAL PRACTICE IN THE SHADOWS OF 
AUTHORITARIANISM 52-54 (2017). 
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control, and can easily see off any challenge.21 Lawyers’ contributions 
and, for that matter, their challenges, if any, are trivial.22 The triviality 
thesis is based on four harmful impact that the crackdown had created 
or reinforced. 
First, there is the incapacitation impact. Repression refrains 
lawyers from engaging in social-legal mobilization.23 The high-profile 
crackdown, coupled with lengthy terms of imprisonment and control 
tightening further, has created a chilling effect to deter most of the 
lawyers, their partners and supporters. 24  The crackdown has 
incapacitated a rights movement that had taken two decades to build, 
and, with the imprisonment, punishment or close monitoring of all key 
movement leaders, the deterrent impact that the crackdown has sent has 
an enduring effect on the legal profession generally.25 
Second, there is the isolation impact. The ground that produced 
past leaders and activists no longer exist, and the support structure that 
had gained strength is under stress and collapsing.26 China under Xi 
has become more repressive politically, and institutions that used to 
nurture and support human rights lawyering have been weakened or 
simply have vanished.27 Clinical education and other platforms for law 
students in public interest work are tightly controlled if still in existence 
at all, depriving human rights lawyers of opportunities to recruit 
volunteers and supporters and to use law schools as a platform to 
promote public interest law. Clinical legal education networks that had 
been instrumental in promoting experiential learning and social 
practices among law students became inactive.28 Foundations, which 
 
        21. Id. 
        22. See, e.g., Yan, supra note 2. 
        23. See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15; see also Alex W. 
Palmer, ‘Flee at Once’: China’s Besieged Human Rights Lawyers, THE N.Y. TIMES MAG. 
(July 25, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/25/magazine/the-lonely-crusade-of-chinas-
human-rights-lawyers.html?_ga=2.5350324.644513532.1528967319-
1693010699.1506870483.  
        24. Id. 
        25. Id. 
26. Cyberspace, Religion, Lawyers, Dissidents: China’s Shrinking Civil Society under Xi 
Jinping’s Crackdown, HKFP (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.hongkongfp.com/2017/10/18/
cyberspace-religion-lawyers-dissidents-chinas-shrinking-civil-society-xi-jinpings-crackdown/ 
[https://perma.cc/S2D4-ND9S]. 
        27. Id. 
28. Communications with lawyers and other related individuals (2017-18). 
1140 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:5 
provide much-needed financial support to law school clinics, have been 
under political pressure to withdraw its support in that sector.29 
Law schools have been under pressure to sever ties with or put 
greater control on, public interest law organizations. For examples, in 
2010, Beijing University Law School ordered the Woman Legal 
Studies and Service Center, led by Guo Jianmei, to leave the 
University,30 and in 2016, Wuhan University Law School ordered the 
Public Interest and Development Law Institute, an advocacy NGO  
closely affiliated with the law school, to leave the Law School 
premises. 31 Under pressure, Wuhan University Law School also 
changed the name of its well-known public interest law center, Center 
for the Protection of Rights of Disadvantaged Citizens, which was set 
up in 1992, into a Legal Aid Center, and also forced its director to 
resign.32 As similar chilling impact had been felt in other law schools 
that have developed a legal aid and clinical education program. When 
Guo Jianmei’s NGO was told to leave from Beijing University, there 
was wide-spread criticism in the media of the University and the law 
school for their action.33 Similar actions that took place six years later 
were met with deafening silence.34 
Equally significant, with the reform of civil procedural law, which 
prohibits lay participation in litigation and the crackdown on rights-
based NGOs, law students are deprived of the opportunity to 
experience social reality, which is regarded as the most important factor 
 
29. Communications with lawyers and other related individuals (2017-18). For studies of 
clinical legal education in China, see Cecily E. Baskir, Crossing Borders: Creating an American 
Law Clinic In China, 19 CLINIC L. REV.  163 (2012); Benjamin L. Liebman Legal Aid and 
Public Interest Law in China, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J.  211 (1999); Titi M. Liu, Transmission of 
Public Interest Law: A Chinese Case Study, 13 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOR. AFF. 263, 282-83 
(2008). 
30. See Wu Xiaolei, Beida Rongbuxia Guo Jianmei [Beida Forced Guo Jianmei to Leave], 
SHIDAI ZHOUBAO [THE TIME WKLY.] (Apr. 15, 2010), http://business.sohu.com/20100415/n2
71520491.shtml [https://perma.cc/MF4R-2RNF]. 
31. Communication with Chinese lawyers (2017). 
32. See China Society for Human Rights Studies, Wuhan University Center for Human 
Rights Research and Education, CHINAHUMANRIGHTS.ORG (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.china
humanrights.org/html/2014/MAGAZINES_1010/805_3.html [https://perma.cc/EZ9C-AEN2]. 
33. For criticism in China’s official media, see, e.g., Wu, supra note 30; Zhang Han, 
Legitimacy of a Legal Center, GLOBAL TIMES (May 12, 2010), http://www.globaltimes.cn/
special/2010-05/531143.html [https://perma.cc/A69G-W5T6]; Wang Xiaoyu, Guo Jianmei: Ni 
Bushi Yige Ren Zai Qianxing [Guo Jianmei, You’re not Alone], DONGFAN ZAOBAO [ORIENTAL 
MORNING POST] (Apr. 19, 2010), http://star.news.sohu.com/20100419/n271596866.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/ZUZ9-GPL4]. 
34. Observation of media reports.  
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in creating a public interest law identity.35 Before 2013, Chinese law 
allowed non-lawyer “citizen representatives,” commonly translated as 
litigants ad litem, to appear in courts as counsel in administrative, civil 
and criminal litigation.36 In addition to qualified lawyers, any citizen 
can be a legal representative in the litigation process. 37  Lay 
participation in legal representation did not only compensate for the 
shortage of lawyers, but also created opportunities for law school legal 
aid centers and public interest-oriented NGOs to provide free legal aid 
services to vulnerable groups in society. 38  In the end, it allowed 
extraordinary opportunities for experiential learning and for nurturing 
a public interest identity through the process.39 
Lay representation was significantly restricted after the 2013 
reform of the Civil Procedural Law. 40  After the amendment, lay 
representation is limited to circumstances in which the workplace or 
the residential committee of a party to a litigation makes a 
recommendation.41 Because of the restriction, citizen representation 
provided by NGOs, activist citizens, and law school legal aid centers 
has diminished significantly, if not vanished completely.42 
Since Xi came to power, media has been under increasingly tight 
control, NGOs are diminishing, and foreign funders and supporters are 
placed under tight control and leaving; the crucial support structure for 
human right lawyering is collapsing.43 Human rights lawyers relied on 
a legal complex composed of social media, NGOs and foreign 
 
        35.  Fu Hualing & Richard Cullen, The Development of Public Interest Litigation in 
China, in PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION IN ASIA 9, 16-7 (Po Jen Yap & Holning Lau ed., 
2010). 
        36. Tin Muk Daisy Cheung, Going Barefoot in the Middle Kingdom: A Preliminary Study 
of the Strategic Choices of the Non-Licensed Weiquan Lawyers in Modern China, 1 UCLA 
PAC. BASIN L.J. 1, 7-8 (2013). 
        37. Id. 
        38. Pamela N. Phan, Clinical Legal Education in China: In Pursuit of a Culture of Law 
and a Mission of Social Justice, 8 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 117, 145-6 (2005). 
        39. Fu & Cullen, supra note 35. 
40. A revision of the Civil Procedure Law was adopted August 31, 2012 and came into 
effect on January 1, 2013. See Civil Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 31, 2012, effective Jan. 1, 
2013); Darcy Pan, Agents of Change or Status Quo? Labor NGOs in South China, in 
UNCERTAIN TIMES: ANTHROPOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO LABOR IN A NEOLIBERAL WORLD 
135, 144-5 (E. Paul Durrenberger ed., 2017). 
         41. Civil Procedure Law, art. 58. 
         42. See, e.g., Phan, supra note 38. 
43. See Hualing Fu, Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption Campaign, 
in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE: ESSAY IN POLITICAL ECONOMY 134-60 
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul Lagunes eds., 2015). 
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supporters. 44  Activist lawyers worked closely with social media to 
publicize their cases and causes, without which lawyers cannot 
mobilize support or interest in public opinions.45 NGOs have been 
indispensable partners for lawyers and the latter rely on NGOs for 
reaching out to the communities, for liaising with litigants, and for 
organizing litigation. 46  The diminishing or even vanishing NGO 
sectors in China place the burden of organizing litigation on lawyers. 
Finally, the control over foreign funding to NGOs and human rights 
lawyers has delivered a significant blow to the human rights 
advocacy.47 
Thirdly, there is the hostility impact. Human rights lawyers 
remain lone fighters—spirited and courageous, but at an infant stage of 
building solid alliance. 48  In particular, they have failed to seek 
understanding and sympathy from state institutions and their link to the 
state remains fragile if at all.49 In social capital literature, linking refers 
to the ability to create cooperative relations and build trust with official 
institutions so to influence government decision-making.50 Compared 
to bridging, which aims at building horizontal ties between groups of 
similar level of political power, linking is a means to build vertical ties 
among groups from different hierarchical levels of power. 51  In the 
context of human rights lawyering, linking refers mainly to the 
possibility of meaningful dialogue and effective communication 
between lawyers and a variety of government entities, including 
political (Party organs), legislative (people’s congresses at various 
levels), judicial (courts and procuratorates), and executive/professional 
bodies (police, bureau of justice, bar associations). While Chinese 
 
         44. Fu, supra note 14.  
         45. See Han Zhu & Fu Hualing, Transparency as an Offence: Rights Lawyering for Open 
Government Information in China, 12:2 J. OF COMP. L. 417, 426-31 (2017); Teng Biao, Rights 
Defence (weiquan), Microblogs (weibo), and the Surrounding Gaze (weiguan): the Rights 
Defence Movement Online and Offline, 3 CHINA PERSP. (2012). 
         46. Fu & Cullen, supra note 35, at 15. 
         47. Zheping Huang, NGOs are under Threat in China’s Latest Crackdown against 
“Foreign Forces”, QUARTZ (Jan. 4, 2017), https://qz.com/873489/ngos-are-trying-to-stay-
alive-in-chinas-latest-crackdown-against-foreign-forces/ [https://perma.cc/5J3T-XVNF]; see 
also Chongyi Feng, The NGO Law in China and its Impact on Overseas Funded NGOs, 3 
COSMOPOLITAN CIV. SOCIETIES: AN INTERDISC. J. 95, 99 (2017). 
        48.   See Pils, supra note 4, at 248-55. 
        49.   Fu, supra note 1, at 11. 
50 . See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF 
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000). 
        51.  Id. 
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human rights lawyers are able to expand their community, build strong 
and close ties among same-minded lawyers, and, to a lesser degree, 
reach out and build alliances with media and NGOs, their relations with 
the Party remain hostile.52 The more they struggle, the more alienated 
they are from the authorities.53 When human rights lawyers look at the 
Party–state in a wide spectrum, they see enemies.54 
Take weiquan lawyers and courts, the traditional partner in a 
liberal legal complex, for instance. Traditional weiquan lawyers were 
suspicious of legal institutions and treat courts as their adversaries 
rather than as partners, which could be relied on in launching any public 
interest legal action.55 Courts in China are not independent, and judges 
largely comply with political instructions from the Party-state. 56 In 
sensitive cases in particular, judges often ignore legal rules and make 
decisions for the sake of political expediency.57 There is not a legal 
complex in China in which lawyers—broadly defined to include 
lawyers, judges, and prosecutors, among others—can form a liberal-
leaning alliance in fighting for a limited state and a large realm of 
freedom.58 In China, the state uses the courts to control the lawyers and 
limit the public interest causes behind the litigation.59 
Not surprisingly, when Chinese lawyers suffer, they suffer at the 
hands of their fellow professionals. It is the judges who limit the access 
to justice for lawyers by refusing to accept claims for litigation.60 It is 
the judges who rule against public interest causes regardless of their 
sound legal grounds.61 When human rights lawyers are disciplined or 
disbarred, it is often because these lawyers have launched an aggressive 
defense in court and protested against unfair treatment and outright 
illegality.62 
 
        52. See generally Feng Chongyi et al., Rights Defence Lawyers as Dissidents in 
Contemporary China, 3 INT’L J. CHINA STUD. 325, 332-340 (2012).  
        53. Id. at 334-35. 
        54. Id. at 332-40; Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 121-23. 
        55. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 120-23; Fu, supra note 1, at 2. 
        56. RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW, 280-309 
(2002). 
        57.  Pils, supra note 4, at 104-40 
        58.  Fu, supra note 14. 
        59.  Pils, supra note 4, at 104-40. 
        60.  Id. at 115-16; China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 39. 
        61.  Fu Hualing, Embedded Socio-Legal Activism in China: The Case of Yirenping, 42 
H.K L.J. 245, 267-68 (2012). 
        62. Pils, supra note 4, at 157-60. 
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Finally, there is the Regulatory Impact. The crackdown does not 
end when lawyers are sentenced to prison terms unfortunately. 63 
Repression through criminal punishment, as we have witnessed during 
the 709 crackdown, has transformed into preemptive regulation that 
combines political monitoring and professional disciplines. 64 
Institutionally, the site of control and resistance has moved from the 
coercive security apparatus to regulation at multiple levels.65 
The crackdown triggered a round of regulatory reinforcement in 
tearing down the support structure of human rights lawyering.66 Courts 
issued rules to reiterate the authority of judges in controlling court 
order, the corresponding duty of lawyers and parties in obeying court 
disciplines, and punishment for disturbing court order and harming 
court safety67 and for demonstrating against courts in areas surrounding 
the courts.68 The MoJ also enacted rules on the management of law 
firms which creates a duty on law firms to monitor, manage and 
discipline lawyers in the firm to prohibit lawyers to encourage and 
organize clients to demonstrate in front of state organs. A wide range 
of activities are now subject to professional discipline, including 
making “misleading and distorting comments” on on-going cases; 
organizing open letters in such cases to create public opinions to 
scandalize and pressurize legal institutions; walking out in protest from 
an ongoing trial; or disrupting court order including intimidating, 
scandalizing or assaulting judicial personnel. Further political 
restriction on legal advocacy includes any challenge to state 
determination of cults; and mostly significantly, making and 
forwarding statements that challenge the basic constitutional system 
 
        63. See China Human Rights Lawyers Concern Group, supra note 15, at 40-44. 
        64. Id. 
        65. Id. 
       66. See Eva Pils, Written Submission on the Human Rights Situation in China—the 
Crackdown on Human Rights Lawyers, CONSERVATIVE HUM. RTS (Apr. 2016), 
http://www.conservativehumanrights.com/reports/submissions/Pils_Submission_on_Human_
Rights_Lawyer_Crackdown.pdf [https://perma.cc/QV9K-FZ9T]. 
67. See Guanyu Tuijin Shenpan Wei Zhongxin De Xingshi Susong Zhidu Gaige De Yijian 
[Opinions on Advancing the Reform of the Trial-Centered Criminal Procedure System] (July 20, 
2016), http://www.court.gov.cn/fabu-xiangqing-28021.html [https://perma.cc/5P6U-BY8M] 
(noting the issuance by the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s Procuratorate and 
the Ministry of Public Security). 
68. See Renmin Faynan, Luoshi  “Baohu Sifa Renyuan Yifa Lüxing Fading Zhize Guiding” 
De Shishi Banfa, [The Implementation Measures for the People’s Courts to Implement the 
Provisions on Protecting Judicial Personnel to Lawfully Perform Their Statutory Duties] (Feb. 
7, 2017), http://www.court.gov.cn/zixun-xiangqing-35572.html [https://perma.cc/QP9L-USM5] 
(noting the issuance by the Supreme People’s Court). 
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and endanger national security or using the Internet to incite 
dissatisfaction of the Party and government. 69  Violation of the 
prohibitive rules may lead to dismissal of the law firm.70 The MoJ 
rules, as stated above, are duly codified in January 2017 in the 
Provisional Rules on Disciplining Members of Law Association for 
Violation of Rules.71 
The MoJ moved quickly to discipline human rights lawyers using 
a wide range of instruments ranging from warning, refusal to renew 
practicing certificates suspending practices to disbarment. 72  While 
repression through criminal law inflicted directly on lawyers by the 
security forces has diminished and is sporadic, political control of the 
professional regulators, which is more embedded, inside out, and 
constant, has become the most significant challenge to the survival of 
human rights lawyering.73 
Examples abound. Social media comments made by human rights 
lawyers are routinely monitored, and Bureaus of Justice (“BoJ”) 
officials have invited lawyers to tea who made comments that were 
regarded as offensive, signed open letters or otherwise participated in 
petitions, demanding deletion, retraction or other undertakings. 74 
During officially sensitive period, officials from the BoJ in Beijing, 
Wuhan, Changsha, Chengdu and many other provinces gave warnings 
to lawyers for making critical comments on-line.75 The consequence 
for not complying could be serious. The activist lawyers who survived 
the crackdown and who refused to be silenced are being disbarred or 
 
69. See Art 50, Lüshi Shiwusuo Guanli Banfa [Measures for the Administration of Law 
Firms] (Nov. 1, 2016), issued by the Ministry of Justice, http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/
2016/content_5109321.htm [https://perma.cc/BLE5-GQVF]. 
70. Id., art. 67. 
71. See Art 34, Lüshi Xiehui Huiyuan Weigui Xingwei Chufen Guize (Shixing) [Rules for 
Punishment of Members’ Misconduct (provisional)] (Jan. 8, 2017), (issued by the All China 
Lawyers Association, Jan. 28, 2017), http://www.scslsxh.com/system/20171025/000002005.
html [https://perma.cc/RQ6E-NKWK]. 
         72. See A Joint Statement to Strongly Condemn the Chinese Government’s Suppression 
against Human Rights Lawyers through Revocation and Invalidation of Lawyers’ Licenses, 
CHRLCG (June 6, 2018), http://www.chrlawyers.hk/en/content/【-joint-statement-strongly-
condemn-chinese-government’s-suppression-against-human-rights [https://perma.cc/S6S5-
XP99].  
        73. Id. 
        74. All information was collected from the Monthly Brief on the Developments in Rights 
and Interests of Chinese Lawyers and Chinese Human Rights Lawyers’ postings on social 
media, LAW. RTS. AND INT. NETWORK [Zhongguo Lüshi Quanyi Dongtai Xinxi], 
http://lvshiquanyiguanzhu.blogspot.hk [https://perma.cc/MTC3-CNN8] (last visited Mar. 22, 
2018). 
75. Id. 
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suspended, largely for making comments critical of the Party, including 
Wu Youshui (nine months suspension) in Huangzhou BoJ in 2017; Zhu 
Shengwu (disbarred) in Shandong in 2017; Wang Liqian and Wang 
Longde (disbarred) in Yunnan in 2017; Yu Wensheng (disbarred) in 
Beijing in 2018; Sui Muqing (disbarred) in Guangzhou in 2018. The 
list goes on and continues to grow.76 Soon, the number of human rights 
lawyers disbarred by BoJ officials will surpass that imprisoned during 
the 709 crackdown.77 Facing continuous state repression, professional 
discipline, and vanishing support from their peers, the broader society 
and legal institutions, the survival of human rights lawyering in China 
is at risk and, even it continues, its contributions will be trivial.78 
III. COOPTATION 
According to the Cooptation Thesis, the legal profession 
including human rights lawyers may represent a powerful social force 
that the Party needs to take seriously.79 In the middle of the crackdown 
on human rights lawyers, the Party is also implementing an 
unprecedented legal reform to further institutionalize the court.80 As 
part of the legal reform, are more proactive and forceful in cooping 
lawyers into the legal process as defined by courts and have engaged 
lawyers with both sticks and carrots. 81  While using law and other 
measures to punish, threaten and discipline lawyers, the Party-state is 
also reaching out to lawyers to improve their relationship and build 
 
76 . See Zhongguo Lüshi, Guanyu Zunzhong He Baozhang Lüshi Zhiye Quanli De 
Shengming [Chinese Lawyers’ Statement on Respecting and Safeguarding Lawyers’ Right to 
Practice], RTS. NET (Feb. 1, 2018), http://wqw2010.blogspot.hk/2018/02/blog-post.html 
[https://perma.cc/E7QW-84UN]. 
        77. A Joint Statement to Strongly Condemn the Chinese Government’s Suppression 
against Human Rights Lawyers through Revocation and Invalidation of Lawyers’ Licenses, 
supra note 72. 
        78. Yedu, supra note 18.  
        79.  See Chen Youxi: Fazhi de Xianshi yu Qianzhan (Da Dushi Kuaibao Wen) [Chen 
Youxi: Reality and Prospect of the Rule of Law (Interview with the City Express)] (Mar. 10, 
2011), http://www.glawyer.net/article/180.html [https://perma.cc/F4LN-4K2W].  
80 . See Hualing Fu, Building Judicial Integrity in China, 39) HASTINGS INT’L AND 
COMPARATIVE L. REV. 167 (2016); Randall Peerenboom, Fly High the Banner of Socialist Rule 
of Law with Chinese Characteristics!, 7 HAGUE J. ON THE RULE OF L. 49 (2015). 
        81. SEE YOU IN COURT, THE ECONOMIST 31-32 (Sept. 30, 2017). 
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trust.82 Indeed, the official media was careful not to cast the net of 
repression and condemnation too wide.83 
In the post-crackdown era, the Party has also sent some 
conciliatory signals to placate the profession in general, and regulation 
replaced repression.84 Repression alone would never work in achieving 
regime survival, and, in China’s authoritarian state, there is a 
relationship of “contingent symbiosis” between the state and civil 
society in which the state negotiates with society in reaching 
compromises.85 Lawyering, and for that matter, the legal system in its 
entirety,86 is a conservative enterprise that is firmly embedded in and 
reinforces the existing political and legal order.87 It operates largely 
within a legal framework.88 Persistent repression may drive die-hard 
lawyers underground and radicalize human rights lawyers.89 The Party 
has proven adaptable to new challenges and remained resilient,90 and 
is able to capture emerging challenges through state-initiated legal 
reform.91 
 
        82. See, e.g., Zhang Jun: Lvxie Yao Tingzai Qianmian Ciqian Zhize Buming Zeren Zai 
Women [Zhang Jun: Lawyers Associations Should Take the Lead and We Should Be Blamed for 
the Unclear Obligations and Duties], LEGAL DAILY, (Aug. 31, 2017), 
http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2017-08-31/doc-ifykpuuh9917522.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/HMF6-CRZ8]. 
        83. See, e.g., Zheng Yan, Lvshi de Zhanchang Yingzai Fating [Lawyers’ Battlefield 
should be in Court], PEOPLE’S DAILY (July 12, 2015), http://opinion.people.com. 
cn/n/2015/0712/c1003-27290080.html; Wei Zhezhe, Ruhe Baozhang Lvshi Hefa Quanli [How 
to Protect Lawyers’ Legal Rights?], PEOPLE’S DAILY 19 (Feb 7, 2018). 
        84. See, e.g., Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court, the Supreme People’s 
Procuratorate, the Ministry of Public Security and Other Departments on Legally Protecting 
Lawyers’ Practicing Rights (Sept. 16, 2015); Wei, supra note 83. 
85. Anthony J. Spires, Contingent Symbiosis and Civil Society in an Authoritarian State: 
Understanding the Survival of China’s Grassroots NGIS, 117 AM. J. OF SOC. 1 (2011). 
86. See Kwai Hang Ng & He Xin, EMBEDDED COURTS: JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING IN 
CHINA (2017). 
87. For the political embeddedness of lawyers in China, see Ethan Michelson, Lawyers, 
Political Embeddedness, and Institutional Continuity in China’s Transition from Socialism, 113 
(2) AM. J. OF SOC. 459 (2007); Liu & Halliday, supra note 6. 
       88. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 112, 116-20. 
       89. Fu & Cullen, supra note 4, at 57-58. 
90. See Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, 14 J. DEMOCRACY 6 (2003); DAVID 
SHAMBAUGh, CHINA’S COMMUNIST PARTY: ATROPHY AND ADAPTATION (2008). 
        91. See Carl Minzner, Legal Reform in the Xi Jinpng Era, 20 ASIAN POLICY 4, 4-9 
(2015); Fu Hualing, Politiczed Challenges, Depoliticized Responses: Political Monitoring in 
China’s Transitions, in Surveillance, in COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COMPARATIVE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 296-312 (Fergal Davis et al., eds., 2014); See You in Court, supra note 
81. 
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Lawyers may dissent, but in the end, legal reform is able to absorb 
the energies that the legal profession may release and eventually silence 
or tame those challenging voices in the bar. The triviality thesis is 
wrong in that it presumes that the Party is hostile to the causes that 
human rights lawyers advocate and punish lawyers because the Party 
fundamentally disagrees with the ideas that those lawyers stand for. 
Following that logic, since the Party had Xu Zhiyong convicted for 
organizing demonstrations to demand equal right to education for 
migrant children, then the Party must be hostile to the substantive idea 
that Xu and his comrades struggled for. If the Party had lawyers and 
labor NGOs punished for organizing collective bargaining, then 
collective bargaining must be something that the Party is hostile to or 
uncomfortable with. 
The difficulty with this reasoning is that the Party has a variety of 
individuals punished for multiple reasons including blowing the 
whistle against corruption, campaigning against sexual harassment in 
public transport, and advocating for equality rights or government 
transparency.92 Most of the causes that lawyers were punished for have 
also been on the reform agenda of the Party.93 The hostility, upon closer 
examination, is directed not against the ideas qua ideas, but the 
individuals who assert a representative role over the matter and the way 
they went about in putting them into practice. 94 
There is often a consensus between the Party and its “enemies” 
that there is an urgent need for certain policy reform, and their fight, to 
a large degree, is over the ownership of the issue, pace of reform, and 
the proper methodology that can be used to solve the problem.95 It is 
often the case that once the fight is over and lawyers are put away, the 
Party would soon initiate reform that the lawyers demanded and were 
punished for. 96  The Party initiated anti-corruption campaigns after 
having lawyers and others punished for exposing corruption and 
demanding enforcement, passed rules to discipline police after having 
sanctioned lawyers and others who campaigned against police abuse of 
 
       92. See Pils, supra note 20, at 51; Leta Hong Fincher, China’s Feminist Five, 4 DISSENT 
84-90 (2016). 
       93. See, e.g., Fu Hualing, Wielding the Sword: President Xi’s New Anti-Corruption 
Campaign, in GREED, CORRUPTION, AND THE MODERN STATE 134-158 (2015); Fincher, supra 
note 92. 
        94. Id. 
        95. Fu, supra note 93, at 147-8. 
        96. Id. 
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power,97 and implemented collective bargaining and started to reform 
official unions immediately after having people imprisoned for 
advocating the very ideas.98 
The Party is willing to implement some reform that lawyers 
advocate, and lawyers are a crucial part of the process.99 But lawyers’ 
participation has to be managed and placed under the firm hands of 
Party. In essence, it is the Party’s reform, and thus should be properly 
credited to, and carried out under, the leadership and guidance of the 
Party, and according to a pace as the Party sees fit. 
What are the cooptation strategies? First of all, the Party has, 
through prosecution and public censure, separated hard-core weiquan 
lawyers from other types of human rights lawyers, especially the die-
hard lawyers in the criminal bar.100 In justifying the 709 crackdown, 
the People’s Daily, for example, made a distinction between die-hard 
lawyers who advocated forcefully inside the court and those who 
mobilized aggressively outside the court.101 While it condemned extra-
judicial activism harshly, it expressed certain respect for lawyers who 
pushed the legal limit within the court. 102  More recently, Xiong 
Xuanguo, a Vice Minister of the MoJ, openly congratulated die-hard 
lawyers for contributions in the overturning of a number of high profile 
wrongful conviction cases. 103  Similarly, Zhang Jun, the former 
Minister of Justice replacing the disgraced Wu Aiying, praised Tian 
Wenchang, a leading criminal lawyer known for his courage and skills 
 
97. For instance, in December 2016 the Chinese authorities proposed to amend the 1996 
Police Law to specify the circumstances under which police can use firearms. Dong Heng, Draft 
Law Includes First Gun Use Rules for Police, SIX TONE (Dec. 5, 2016), 
http://www.sixthtone.com/news/1645/rules-gun-use-chinese-police-put-draft-law 
[https://perma.cc/SK3T-QEQF]. 
98. See Stefan Brehm, Collective Bargaining: New Hope for China’s Workers?, INST. FOR 
SECURITY & DEV. POL’Y (Mar. 31, 2017), http://isdp.eu/publication/collective-bargaining-new-
hope-china/ [https://perma.cc/6KX3-TT6A]. 
       99. See, e.g., Keith J. Hand, Citizens Engage the Constitution: The Sun Zhigang Incident 
and Constitutional Review Proposals in the People’s Republic of China, in BUILDING THE 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA 221-42 (Stephanie Balme & Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2009). 
       100. See, e.g., Zou Wei & Huang Qiangchang, Jiekai “Weiquan” Shijian de Heimu 
[Exposing the Dark Inside of “Weiquan” Incidents], PEOPLE’S DAILY (Jul. 12, 2015); Zheng, 
supra note 83. 
        101.  Zheng, supra note 83. 
102. Id. 
103 . Mr. Xiong said that “the profession and the entire society” recognized lawyers’ 
significant role. See Lin Zizhen, Xiong Xuanguo: Chongfen Zunzhong Lvshi Yijian Neng Bimian 
Yuan’an [Xiong Xuanguo: Fully Respecting Lawyers’ Opinions Can Avoid Wrongful 
Convictions], CAIXIN, (Apr. 27, 2017), http://m.china.caixin.com/m/2017-04-27/
101083751.html [https://perma.cc/39C5-MMKL] (last visited March 22, 2018). 
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in representing sensitive cases in the 1990s, as a true die-hard 
lawyer.104 
Lawyer-official meetings seem a regular practice. 105  Upon 
assuming duty, the Chief Justice, Zhou Qiang, also made some 
symbolic gestures to patch up relations. 106  The Chief Justice has 
repeatedly spoken on the importance of legal representation in the 
judicial process and the need for courts to respect lawyers and take 
seriously their submissions. 107  He said that respecting lawyers and 
relying on lawyers (and legal scholars) has significant instrumental and 
normative values.108 The legal profession is an integral part of the legal 
community, and, as such, cooperative relations with and high trust from 
lawyers are indispensable for the court to build and restore its 
credibility and legitimacy.109 The court reform is still on-going and 
expanding in both depth and scope, lawyers, who were allowed only to 
shout at the system from outside, may have better opportunities to 
reform the system from within, if lawyers are willing to adopt, tone-
down their rhetoric and, in particular, accept the political reality.110 
The former Minister of Justice, Zhang Jun, following the example 
of the Chief Justice, tried to send a reconciliatory message to all human 
rights lawyers by meeting with more than fifty lawyers upon assuming 
office.111 Unlike the Chief Justice, Zhang met lawyers from a wide 
range of political stances including weiquan lawyers, such as Li 
Fangping and Chen Jiangang, whose critical views of the government 
have been well known. 112  During the meeting, Zhang openly 
 
104 . See Jiang Anjie, 68 Wei Xingbian Lvshi Shouci Yu Buzhang Mianduimian [68 
Criminal Lawyers Meeting with Minister of Justice for the First Time], FAZHI RIBAO [LEGAL 
DAILY] (Aug. 29, 2017), http://www.legaldaily.com.cn/leader/content/2017-08/29/content_
7298802.htm [https://perma.cc/YM8U-F7TL]. 
        105.   Monthly Brief on the Developments in Rights and Interests of Chinese Lawyers, 
supra note 74. 
106. See The Supreme People’s Court, Quan Shehui Gongtong Nvli Tuijin Zhengsifa 
Tisheng Sifa Gongxinli [The Whole Society Works Hard to Promote Fair Justice and Enhance 
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complained about the facts that security forces in the past detained 
lawyers without properly notifying the MoJ and promised to provide a 
“home” for lawyers in trouble.113 
Taking their cue from Beijing, Lawyers’ Associations in Beijing, 
Guangzhou and elsewhere have, since May 2017, reached out to 
weiquan lawyers who are members of the respective lawyer’s 
associations to solicit critical views of associations. 114  The 
conversation between Chen Jiangang and Cheng Hai (who represent 
Wang Quanzhang, one of the lawyers detained during the 709 
crackdown) and the President of Beijing Lawyers’ Association, Gao 
Zicheng, illustrated the willingness on the part of the MoJ to make a 
change. 115 Cheng Hai and Chen Jiangang complained about the failure 
on the part of Beijing Lawyers’ Association to offer effective 
protection of the rights of its members and, in particular, the lack of 
legal defense in the case of Wang Quanzhang.116 Interestingly, that 
conversation led to a subtle reply from the Beijing Lawyers Association 
that the Lawyers Association of Tianjin, where Wang had been 
detained, would offer assistance on the matter.117 And a few weeks 
later, a controversial meeting between lawyer Chen Youxi and Wang 
occurred.118 
It seems possible that the MoJ arranged that surprising but 
significant meeting between Chen and Wang to demonstrate that the 
MoJ’s new leadership could make a difference and also that lawyers 
could participate in even the most sensitive case under the new 
leadership. The meeting proved to be highly controversial and drove 
another wedge between weiquan lawyers and die-hard lawyers, and 
 
113. See Zhang Jun: Lawyers Associations Should Take the Lead and We Should Be 
Blamed for the Unclear Obligations and Duties supra note 82. 
        114. See, e.g., 2017 Nian 6 Yuefen de Zhongguo Lüshi Quanyi Dongtai Xinxi [Monthly 
Brief on the Developments in Rights and Interests of Chinese Lawyers (June 2017)], LAW. 
RTS. AND INT. NETWORK, http://lvshiquanyiguanzhu.blogspot.hk [https://perma.cc/Z5EW-
28AR] (last visited June 16, 2018). 
115. See Cheng Hai, Lvshi Chenghai He Chen Jiangang Yingyue Yu Beijing Lvshi Xiehui 
Gao Zicheng Huizhang Deng Huimian [Lawyers Cheng Hai and Chen Jiangang Met with the 





118. See Chen Youxi, “Guanpai Lvshi” Bude Bushuo De Jiju Hua [Some Words the 
“State-appointed” Lawyer Has to Say], SINA (July 26, 2017), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_
63aeaff70102x764.html [https://perma.cc/FKQ6-Z73V]. 
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created another split between human rights lawyers who are allegedly 
officially appointed working within the system and for the system and 
those who remain independent.119 Chen Youxi was a well-known sike 
lawyer, who developed his fame as a leading sike lawyer for his defense 
of lawyer Li Zhuang during Bo Xilai’s rule in Chongqing.120 Chen, 
however, while remaining faithful to the sike tradition, later developed 
a reputation for cooperating with investigators and prosecutors and for 
his willingness to work with, instead of working against, the 
government in hard cases.121 Chen Youxi had shown little interest in 
the 709 cases in general and the arranged meeting with Wang, 
regardless of who was behind the decision, proved to be offensive to 
all the weiquan lawyers who had been fighting hard for Wang’s cause 
ever since his highly secretive detention.122 The All China Lawyers 
Association (ACLA) had to make a public statement that lawyers are 
equal members under the Lawyers Law and no such division exists 
between lawyers who are inside the system and those who are 
without.123 
Second, the MoJ has become more forceful and assertive in 
regulating the profession, with the law associations playing a proactive 
role in making a more effective regulatory system.124 Whether the joint 
efforts by the MoJ and the subsidiary ACLA can create a “home” for 
lawyers, potentially a shelter for lawyers in trouble, is difficult to see. 
At least the Ministry has openly shown that they are not pleased and 
uncomfortable with security overreach and complain that security 
 
        119.  Li Ruohan, Lawyer Warns Colleagues to Avoid Illegal Means to Address Injustice 
as Case Sparks Debate, GLOBAL TIMES (Jul. 27, 2017), http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/
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        120. Fu, supra note 1, at 4-6. 
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politics/article/2104246/missing-human-rights-lawyer-good-health-tianjin 
[https://perma.cc/YBD6-Z5WH]; also see Chen, supra note 115. 
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REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 25, 2017), http://www.moj.gov.cn/2017/0825/5666.html 
[https://perma.cc/NP6T-N8X5]. 
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detained lawyers without notifying the MoJ before detention of lawyers 
was proved.125 
In doing so, the MoJ may be sending out a message to both sides, 
lawyers and their minders, that it is in charge and has to be taken 
seriously. On the one hand, the MoJ reminds the security forces of its 
authority as the regulator of lawyers, and therefore its review on action 
taken against lawyers should be properly sought and respected. While 
this intra-government communication is not visible, it can be inferred 
from public statements made by MoJ officials, including their critical 
view of a security overreach and the newly found confidence and 
assertion of authority on the part of the MoJ in their dealing with other 
legal institutions such as the SPC and the public security.126 
On the other hand, the MoJ is tightening the regulation of the legal 
profession and enhancing the disciplinary capacity of law associations 
and law firms over individual lawyers, leading to promulgation of a 
series of prohibitive rules and measures to rein in the out-of-courts 
speech and extra-legal activism of lawyers. 127  Those rules and 
measures are regarded as repressive—even more so than the 709 
crackdown because it lowers the threshold of controls by punishing 
mere speech of lawyers, and because the ultimate punishment—that is 
disbarment— is harsh.128 Naturally those new rules and measures have 
received much critical attention by lawyers and commentors, who 
argue that an assertive MoJ has not helped lawyers as it claims.129 On 
the contrary, it has become another oppressor which controls lawyers 
at a much closer distance. It is therefore hard to reconcile the repressive 
professional control over law firms and lawyers and some of the 
repressive episodes, as outlined above, with MoJ’s claim that it tightens 
the discipline out of its “deeply-felt care for lawyers,” implying that it 
 
125. See Sifabu Shuli Muqian Lvshi Zhiye Quanli Baozhang Cunzai de Shida Wenti 
[Ministry of Justice Identified Ten Issues in Protestation of Laywer’s Rights to Practice], 
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        129. Id. 
1154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:5 
punishes lawyers and puts the house in order to preempt further 
repression from the security forces.130 
Finally, the continuous promotion of legal reform in the post-709 
era is creating more space in the legal system to make lawyering more 
meaningful and effective. Some of the changes are substantial to coopt 
lawyers into the institutional process. Three examples can highlight the 
efforts to bring lawyers into the legal process and make lawyers’ 
participation more meaningful and effective. 
The first is the increase in legal aid budget to improve access to 
lawyers.131 As the rule of law project in China, as the Party defines it, 
continues, 132  government legal aid funding continues to grow. The 
Party has demonstrated a strong political determination to expand the 
legal aid system and also the financial capacity to do so.133 In 2015, for 
example, the Party’s General Office and that of the State Council, two 
key policy-making bodies in China’s political structure, jointly issued 
a document entitled Opinions on Improving the Legal Aid System 
(Opinions). The Opinions demanded concrete measures to be taken to 
channel disputes and conflicts into the legal process through the 
expansion of legal aid to disputes involving labor, family, food and 
medicine, education and medical care; they also require the creation of 
a duty lawyer scheme in courts and detention centers.134 For those who 
promote legal aid in China, the Party has offered a target list of 
commitments.135 The State’s 13th Five Year Plan further undertakes the 
improvement of general public services and has included legal aid 
service as part of the larger public services that the government is duty-
bound to provide.136 The legal aid budget from both the central and 
local levels have increased on par with the growth of the Chinese GDP, 
 
        130. See Ministry of Justice Identified Ten Issues in Protestation of Lawyer’s Rights to 
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135. Id. 
136 . See THE 13TH FIVE YEARS PLAN OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL 
DEVELOPMENT OF PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA, Ch. 75 § 4, (Mar. 17, 2016) 
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and the amount of case subsidies that the government pays per case 
have also increased correspondingly.137 Beyond broader rule of law 
promotion, the Party is also increasing public spending on public 
services to improve the livelihood of the poor with specific reference 
to the constitutional right of equality for all.138 
Secondly, with the improvement in legal aid, the SPC is in the 
process of making it legally compulsory to provide defense in every 
criminal case unless a defendant decides otherwise. 139 With the right 
to defense in criminal cases being regarded as a core human right, the 
central government is strongly incentivized to improve access to 
lawyers in criminal cases as soon as the police finish their first round 
of interrogation. 140 In a new pilot project in eight provinces, the MoJ 
and SPC have provided comprehensive legal aid coverage for all 
criminal cases at trial, on appeal and for post-conviction reviews where 
the defendant has no legal representative. 141 The court is invested with 
the duty to inform a competent legal aid center and failure to notify 
where this leads to the deprivation of the defendant’s right to lawyer 
“shall” result in the appellant court automatically quashing the 
conviction and remanding the case for a retrial.142 
Finally, to take one step further, the Party has promoted class 
action and public interest litigation (PIL) that is controlled by the 
government and led by the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP) to 
channel collective disputes back to the courts for legal resolution.143 To 
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take oxygen out of the fire of the human rights lawyers-led social-legal 
activism, this SPP-led PIL reform, in particular, aims to create more 
space in the judicial system to bring collective disputes to the courts.144 
There are abundant mass disputes affecting the rights and interests of 
particular groups of people, which have failed to reach the courts for 
legal resolution.145 And with the assistance of human rights lawyers 
and NGOs, these groups have increasingly resorted to non-institutional, 
extra-legal measures to assert their rights.146 The refocusing of the legal 
system on class action and PIL expects to bring mass disputes from 
streets to the courtroom-- a process that is likely to undermine the 
mobilization capacity of weiquan lawyers and at the same time to 
provide further opportunities for rule-based legal advocacy within the 
legal process.147 
IV. RESILIENCE 
Finally, there is a more optimistic Resilience Thesis.148 There is 
always a debate on the degree to which human rights lawyers should 
engage with the legal system and whether lawyers should act merely as 
legal technicians arguing narrow legal issues in courts or should 
broaden the horizon and take a wider political-legal view. 149  Should 
lawyers merely rely on law, use law proactively in a dynamic fashion 
or should they challenge law’s vulnerability to de-legitimize the 
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challenging lawyers’ professional ethics and political resolve before 
and after the crackdown.151 What happens if law is limited in achieving 
lawyers’ ambition and what would be the alternatives? There are 
radically different views, and harsh criticisms continue to be made by 
human rights lawyers against one another for their differences. 152  
Lawyers will not be silenced, marginalized or coopted as an integral 
part of the regime.153 With that independent spirit as the backdrop, 
some human rights lawyers will continue to push the boundaries that 
have been set by the Party.154 There is nothing new about crackdown 
on lawyers155 even though the most recent one is more severe one in 
both the harshness of penalty and the scope of prosecution. 156 But 
human right lawyers prove to be resilient and always return with 
vengeance after a crackdown.157 
At a foundational level, China remains unchanged on two 
significant issues and the ground that produced weiquan lawyers in the 
past will continue to work in their reproduction. 
First, the social and economic background that created the 
weiquan lawyers in the first place continue to exist. Abuse of power 
and scandals that shocked the conscience of weiquan lawyers and 
motivated them to take the identity of human rights defenders remain 
in existence, and they will continue to reproduce dedicated human 
rights defenders as they did. 158  If the persecution of Falun Gong 
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practitioners made lawyer Gao Zhisheng,159 systematic discrimination 
and radical responses against the discriminatory rules and practices 
nurtured Lu Jun,160 Sun Zhigang’s death created Teng Biao and Xu 
Zhiyong,161 and Deng Yujiao’s self-help confirmed Xia Lin and others’ 
identity as human rights defenders, then all those abuses continue to 
exist and will work to catalyze another radicalizing process. 162 
Wrongful conviction, wide-spread discriminatory practices and 
political and religious prosecution are at work in reproducing a new 
generation of human rights lawyers.163 To its credit, the Party has been 
successful in its governance reform to reduce inequality, enhance 
legality, and rein in abusive and powerful local officials to control the 
level of social tension.164 But the authoritarian nature of the Party-
state—for example, its intolerance of an independent space for religion 
and labor and consequently a need to control religion and prohibit 
independent labor movement—necessarily creates challengers to its 
system.165 
Second, the traditional dilemma of authoritarian legality remains 
intact. On the one hand, the Party continues to promote legal rights, 
enhance the capacity of judicial organs in dispute resolution and 
develop rules-based governance in social and economic matters.166 As 
mentioned above, legal aid is improving, access to justice is improving, 
and ordinary justice is improving.167 As long as the regime promotes 
the rule of law as a key governance strategy, law will empower lawyers 
in their struggle for better protection of rights and for effective 
accountability. Law, even in China, offers promises, generates hope, 
and incentivizes action. 168  As long as legal rights are officially 
pronounced and procedures in place for their implementation, 
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aggrieved individuals will make corresponding claims and rights 
lawyers will seize the opportunity and step forward to use law to hold 
the regime accountable. This is part of the professional DNA and a right 
that the Party cannot deny. 
On the other hand, the regime’s commitment to law is partial and 
limited and law’s full potential as an autonomous force is something 
the Party is deeply concerned with.169 The Party will become repressive 
if legal claims and lawyers’ legal mobilization are collective and 
organized and regarded as politically challenging and risky to the 
Party’s legitimacy and effectiveness.170 The Party promotes rights and 
implements law but only to the degree it sees fit, and once the boundary 
is crossed, it can mobilize its repressive apparatus to crash the 
challenge. 171  Therefore, conscience-shocking episodes, unfulfilled 
legal promises and political intolerance, in combination, may be the 
best recipe for the creation of weiquan lawyering. Human rights 
lawyers are the ones who test the uncertain boundary at the social-legal 
frontiers. That dynamic worked in the past in catalyzing a rights 
movement and the same dynamic will continue to produce a generation 
of human rights lawyers.172 
Extra-legal mobilization is necessary and unavoidable to address 
past wrong or to seek future transformation.173 There remain many 
circumstances in which weiquan lawyers, together with other activists, 
have to confront with the system directly by organizing street 
protests.174 Many of the cases that triggered mobilization may not be 
justiciable, such as the extra-legal detention of Falun Gong members 
and political dissidents, the massive censorship as applied online and 
offline, or lack of political accountability as in the case of demanding 
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disclosure of assets of officials, are, essentially, political.175 They can 
only be challenged through a political process and, in the Chinese 
circumstances, the only political channel available is public 
demonstration of anger, public shaming of officials and public demand 
for accountability. 176 Indeed, in spite of the on-going legal reform, 
many human rights lawyers remain disillusioned with the entire legal 
process and may be ready to opt for a political confrontation.177 For 
them, public exposure of systematic wrongs and open expression of 
common grievances are both rights and virtues regardless of their 
utilities.178 They argue that if the political system is the root cause of 
the social problem, then lawyers should have the honesty and courage 
to make it explicit in their legal advocacy.179 
But in the eyes of the Party, however, lawyers are slowly sliding 
to the political end of the mobilization spectrum, and, especially with 
foreign funding and involvement, have embarked on a color revolution 
against the Party’s political power. 180  Frustrated with the legal 
constraints in the Chinese legal process and fearful of the crackdown, 
some human rights lawyers and other activists have scattered into 
communities and started the painstaking and potentially long process 
of social empowerment and mobilization. 181  As mentioned above, 
human rights lawyers have, in the past, begun to play a meaningful role 
in building civil society capacity by offering training, enhancing 
awareness, designing strategies and taking part in or leading social-
legal action. 182  In doing so, human rights lawyers are becoming 
movement leaders and spokespersons or even representative of certain 
social groups.183 Instead of giving legal advice, lawyers have joined the 
causes of, and taken the same identity as, the groups they seek to 
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represent.184  Lawyers have immersed themselves in a movement and 
play certain leading and organizing roles in articulating and asserting 
rights and interests on behalf of certain social groups.185 
Human right lawyers in China are not irrelevant as the triviality 
thesis suggests and cannot be simply ignored. Repression remains a 
core component in the regime governance strategy, but repression 
alone cannot produce good governance, especially in dealing with part 
of the legal profession. 186 Human rights lawyers cannot be effectively 
captured either, as the corporatist thesis would has us believe, because 
human rights lawyers subscribe to a different value system, which is 
fundamentally incompatible with the existing political and legal 
order.187 
The fighting spirits remain in spite of the repression and because 
of the repression.188 The commitment among rights lawyers and to a 
large cause and resilience in their struggling are both saddening and 
encouraging. Take Xie Yang’s case for example. Xie Yang was one of 
the lawyers who were arrested in the 709 crackdown and the only one 
who was from outside Beijing.189 Lawyers, such as Jiang Tianyong, 
Chen Jiangang, and Lin Qilei, gathered to his rescue and showed their 
support, leading to their own detention and near constant harassment 
and monitoring.190 
Xie was given a lenient sentencing after a confession.191 At the 
same time, the government continued to punish, through criminal 
prosecution and disciplinary proceedings, human rights lawyers who 
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remain defiant. Jiang Tianyong was sentenced to a 2 year term 
imprisonment, for his visit to Xie’s family in Hunan while he was in 
detention.192 It was said that Jiang felt guilty for not being punished in 
the initial 709 crackdown and the sense of guilt drove him to take 
provocative action knowing the risks that may involve. 193  Another 
lawyer, Yu Wensheng, who defended one of the 709 lawyers, was 
detained in 2018 for disrupting the performance of public duties, and, 
after entering a legality trapping door, was charged with a far more 
serious offense of subverting state power.194  Yu, a believer of the 
mantra that the best offense is the best defense, issued an open letter 
calling for the election of the State President from multiple candidates, 
and he was detained a few hours after he publicized the open letter.195 
Yu is now defended by activist lawyers, and the tragedy is the fact that 
Xie Yang has now come forward to defend Yu.196 
Repression emboldens otherwise moderate lawyers to their legal 
resistance. Given the hostile atmosphere that has been created, lawyers 
may seem to be fighting a losing battle and some lawyers may be seen 
to be acting in desperation. Yu’s open letter calling for the election of 
the President immediately before the Party announced its decision to 
end the two-term limit of the Presidency is courageous.197 But at the 
same time, few would have been surprised at the way the Party has 
acted. 198  Lawyer Yang Jingzhu’s open insult to the entire Hangzhou 
court for what Yang regarded as wanton disregard for procedures in a 
murder trial may have made it impossible for the government not to 
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punish him. 199  But lawyers nevertheless keep on fighting using all 
social legal means that are available. They have yet to be silenced.200 
V. CONCLUSION 
Having crashed the activist lawyers and placed human rights 
lawyers under tight political and professional control, the Party has also 
initiated a round of legal reform to create a more autonomous and 
effective judicial space to lure lawyers from the streets back into the 
courts. Lawyers’ battleground is in the courtroom, as the Party 
admonishes lawyers, 201  but returning to court is possible and 
meaningful only if the court process is fair, independent and effective. 
The judicial process has to be credible for lawyers and their clients to 
buy into. The bargain that the Party aims to strike is clear: 1) lawyers 
will consent to a diminished role in a range of politically sensitive or 
significant cases, such as corruption cases and national security cases, 
broadly defined, in exchange for an enhanced role in routine cases 
touching on general social and economic rights; 2) lawyers will refrain 
themselves from engaging in extra-legal activism in both real and 
virtual worlds as they used to do in exchange for a more effective 
advocacy in a more meaningful legal process. 
Under this conceptualization, lawyers’ extra-legal mobilization 
on streets and social media will be further restricted; but their functions 
in the court process will be further enhanced. Moreover, lawyers’ 
contributions to decision-making in sensitive cases are likely to decline 
and diminish, if not vanish, but will increase in cases of ordinary 
justice. As judicial reform goes on, the adjudication process is likely to 
be more court-centric and rule-bounded with judges playing a more 
decisive role in the decision-making process. In that court-centric 
process, lawyers’ advocacy is likely to become an indispensable and 
integral part of the judicial process, eventually making legal advocacy 
in courts attractive enough so that lawyers can concentrate on legal 
advocacy and make courts their sole battleground. 
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 But many questions remain unanswered. Will human rights 
lawyers, as politicized as they have been, accept the Party’s partial 
commitment to the rule of law? Would the legal reform offer too little 
to develop a court-centric legal process? Will lawyers accept political 
constraints as imposed by the Party? Will lawyers accept executive 
determination of Falun Gong or other religious groups an evil cult as 
the Party demands? Would human right lawyers accept the fact that 
dissidents and defendants in sensitive cases will have officially 
appointed lawyers only; and how would lawyers face the evidential 
challenges in corruption cases in which lawyers are barred from the 
entire investigative stage? 
Would the partial legal reform, coupled with sever crackdown, be 
able to halt the radicalizing process that we have observed in the past? 
As discussed in the Article, in China’s social and economic transition, 
there are bound to be abuses and miscarriages of justice leading to 
human sufferings. Those sufferings, which had catalyzed human rights 
lawyering in the past, will continue to provide a fertile ground for 
social-legal activism. While China is reforming its legal system and 
expanding the judicial space to create room for meaningful and 
effective lawyering, the Party’s commitment to a court-centric and 
rule-based dispute resolution is partial and limited, and, as such, the 
legal process, while being reformed, remains superficial and continues 
to lack the necessary credibility and effectiveness in solving social 
problems that triggered the human rights lawyering in the first place. 
While determined lawyers may continue to resort to extra-legal social-
legal activism on traditional or new forums, this option has become 
increasingly risky.  
 
